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ABSTRACT
The Quest to Secure Email: A Usability Analysis
of Key Management Alternatives
Jeffrey Thomas Andersen
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
The current state of email security is lacking, and the need for end-to-end encryption
of email is clear. Recent research has begun to make progress towards usable, secure email
for the masses (i.e., novice users without IT support). In this paper, we evaluate the usability
implications of three different key management approaches: PGP, IBE, and passwords.
Our work is the first formal A/B evaluation of the usability of different key management
schemes, and the largest formal evaluation of secure email ever performed. Our results reveal
interesting inherent usability trade-offs for each approach to secure email. Furthermore, our
research results in the first fully-implemented PGP-based secure email system that has been
shown to be usable for novice users. We share qualitative feedback from participants that
provides valuable insights into user attitudes regarding each key management approach and
secure email generally. Finally, our work provides an important validation of methodology
and design principles described in prior work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

When email was first developed in 1971, no attention was paid to secure it. In recent
years, there has been a strong push to address this by adopting technologies that enhance the
security of email during transmission. Still, recent research has shown that these approaches
(i.e., STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC) are often configured incorrectly and have weaknesses
that can be exploited by attackers [7, 8, 11]. Even if these technologies were properly deployed
and configured, they do nothing to protect email at rest or while it is being processed by an
email server.
These factors motivate the need for secure email that uses end-to-end encryption.1
In secure email, the sender encrypts email messages before transferring them to the email
provider, ensuring that no one but the intended recipients are able to read the messages.
While secure email protocols such as PGP and S/MIME are nothing new, adoption by the
masses has been nearly non-existent.2
One explanation for this poor adoption is secure email’s long history of usability
issues [16, 24, 30]. Recent research has begun making progress towards usable, secure email
for the masses. Ruoti et al. evaluated design principles for creating a highly-usable version
of IBE-based secure email [16, 20].3 Similarly, Atwater et al. [1] explored how PGP-based
secure email could be made more usable.
1
End-to-end encryption of email refers to content-based encryption of email as opposed to connection-level
encryption (e.g., TLS, HTTPS).
2
We note that S/MIME is widely used in certain organizations (e.g., US government), but this adoption
has not spread to the masses.
3
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is described in more detail in Section 3.3.

1

In this paper, we build upon this prior research and explore how different key management approaches affect the usability of secure email. To this end, we build and evaluate three
secure email systems, each based on a different key management approach: PGP, IBE, and
passwords. The systems largely have identical functionality and interfaces, different only as
required by their particular key management scheme. Moreover, these systems incorporate all
prior research into usable, secure email, giving each system its best chance at succeeding. To
evaluate the systems, we conduct a within subjects, paired-participant [19] A/B user study
that involved 47 participant pairs (94 total participants) using all three systems, the largest
study of secure email to date.
The results of our study show that users find both our PGP- and IBE-based secure
email systems to be highly usable. This is the first time a fully-implemented PGP-based
secure email system has been shown to be usable for novice users. Our study also reveals
interesting details on user attitudes regarding secure email.
The contributions of this paper are,
1. First A/B comparison of usability of key management in secure email. In
this paper, we conduct a formal A/B comparison of three different secure email key
management approaches: PGP, IBE, and passwords. Our results demonstrate that
each of these approaches are viable for novice users, though passwords are rated as
slightly less usable. We also evaluate participants’ qualitative responses and identify
several intrinsic usability trade-offs between each system.
2. First empirically verified, usable, PGP-based secure email system. Early
examinations of PGP-based secure email found it to be unusable [24, 30]. More recently,
research has made progress towards usable, PGP-based secure email, but the studies of
these systems did not correctly simulate the experience of a novice user. In this paper,
we use a fully-implemented system and a formal paired-participant methodology [19] to
accurately evaluate the ability of novices to use PGP-based secure email. Our results
demonstrate that participants viewed our PGP-based system as highly usable, with
2

nearly a third of participants preferring it over our IBE- and password-based secure
email systems.
3. User attitudes regarding secure email. Our study elicits user attitudes regarding
the three key management approaches we evaluate. This includes security and usability
trade-offs identified by participants. For example, even after understanding that PGP
provides more security than IBE, many users indicate that they do not need that level
of security and prefer IBE because they don’t have to wait for the recipient to first
install the system. Participant responses also reveal attitudes regarding secure email
generally, such as the fact that many participants will only feel comfortable installing a
secure email system if they know it has been verified by security-conscious individuals.
4. Validation of prior research. Recent research has proposed several design principles
for making secure email usable for novices. In this paper we implement principles
described by Atwater et al. [1] and Ruoti et al. [16, 20]. The positive results of our
user studies provide validation of these design principles. More particularly, our work
demonstrates that the design principles described by Ruoti et al. are generally applicable,
and not just limited to IBE-based secure email. Finally, we replicate Ruoti et al.’s
paired-participant methodology and provide further evidence that it has significant
benefits over traditional methodologies where a study coordinator simulates one end of
an email conversation.

3

Chapter 2
Background

In this section we first describe the current state of email security. We then describe
the threat model for secure email. Finally, we discuss related work on analyzing the usability
of secure email.

2.1

Email Security

When email was first designed in 19711 no meaningful attention was paid to security. As
such, it was originally trivial for an attacker to steal email during transit or to send messages
with falsified sender information. In recent years, there have been attempts to patch security
into email. For example, TLS is now used to protect email during transmission, and DKIM
and DMARC are used to authenticate the sender of an email. However, the deployment of
these technologies is limited and they are often misconfigured.
In an analysis of email delivery security (i.e., TLS, DKIM, DMARC, SPF), Durumeric
et al. found that a majority of email is still vulnerable to attack [7]. They showed that only
35% of SMTP servers are configured to use TLS, and these servers are often vulnerable to a
downgrade attack. Similarly, they demonstrated that the adoption of DKIM and DMARC
are so low that they provide no practical benefits. These results were further confirmed by
concurrent work by both Foster et al. [8] and Holz et al. [11].
As such, email is still an easy target for attackers. For example, Durumeric et al.
found that in seven countries over 20% of inbound Gmail messages are being stolen [7].
1

http://openmap.bbn.com/~tomlinso/ray/firstemailframe.html
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Additionally, the inability to authenticate the sender of an email increases the likelihood of
email phishing, a multi-billion-dollar problem.2 Perhaps most troubling, even if TLS, DKIM,
and DMARC were to be widely adopted and configured correctly, these technologies do
nothing to protect email when at rest.3
End-to-end encryption of email solves each of the above problems. Namely, by
encrypting her email with Bob’s public key, Alice is sure that only Bob can read her email.
Similarly, if Alice has signed the email with her private key, Bob can verify that the email
actually came from Alice. The most common forms of public key encryption are PGP,
S/MIME, and IBE. Descriptions of PGP and IBE are given in Section 3.

2.2

Threat Model

In the threat model for secure email there are four possible entities:
1. User — The user’s computer, operating system, and secure email software are considered
part of the trusted computing base.
2. Email provider — The email provider can be treated as either fully-malicious, honestbut-curious,4 or sometimes-malicious. We define a sometimes-malicious entity as one
that is for the most part honest-but-curious, but from time to time can also take
malicious action and collude with other sometimes-malicious entities. The sometimemalicious model is helpful for two reasons. First, this is a relatively accurate model of
the largest email providers, which are unlikely to attack users’ security unless forced to
do so by an outside entity (e.g., court order). Second, this allows us to more accurately
2

http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/fbi-2-3-billion-lost-to-ceo-email-scams/
At rest, email can be stolen as the result of a breach (https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitivedata-us-officials-say/,
a malicious insider (http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-googleengineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats, or a subpoena (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_
(surveillance_program), http://www.law360.com/articles/488725/post-snowden-google-reportshows-data-requests-growing).
4
An honest-but-curious entity will gather any information available to them (e.g., Gmail scans email
messages), but will not attempt to break the secure email system (e.g., impersonating the user to the key
server) or collude with other honest-but-curious parties).
3

5

analyze systems that only transiently rely on the email provider, such as using email to
verify a user’s identity before they are allowed to post a public key to a key directory.
3. Key server (optional) — Some secure email schemes rely on the use of a trusted
third-party key server, which—similar to the email provider—can be treated as either
fully-malicious, sometimes-malicious, or honest-but-curious. The key server can be
responsible for the generation and storage of key pairs (i.e., key escrow), or it can act as
a lookup directory for individuals to find public keys (i.e., key directory). In either case,
the reliance on this trusted third-party reduces the overall security of the secure email
system. Still, we do note that there are methods for reducing potential harm from a
sometimes-malicious third-party key server (e.g., thresholded-IBE [12], CONIKS [13]).
4. Adversary — The adversary is free to eavesdrop on any communication between
users, email providers, and key servers.5 Additionally, the adversary can attempt to
compromise the email provider or key server. The adversary wins if she is able to use
these resources to access the plaintext contents of the encrypted email body.
We do not consider attacks directly against the user or trusted computing base (i.e.,
phishing credentials, installing malicious software). Similarly, we do not consider an attacker
who can compromise fundamental networking primitives (i.e., TLS, DNS). While these are
valid concerns, if the attacker can accomplish these types of attacks, they can already do
far more damage than they could by breaking the secure email system.6 We also note that
data needed by the email provider to transmit email (e.g., recipient addresses) cannot be
encrypted, and may be available to the adversary (e.g., this information may be passed over
an unencrypted channel). Our threat model instead focuses on ensuring that the data in the
encrypted body is safe from an attacker.
5

In nearly all cases, this communication will be encrypted using TLS, and the adversary only has access
to the encrypted packets.
6
For example, if an attacker can arbitrarily compromise TLS they can replace all software downloaded by
a user, including the secure email system, with versions that contain malware.
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To steal the user’s sensitive data, the adversary must obtain both the encrypted email
and the key material needed to decrypt the email. The former can be accomplished by either
compromising the email provider, or intercepting an encrypted email that is not transmitted
using TLS. The latter can be accomplished by users revealing this information, or in the case
of key escrow by compromising the key escrow server. In that case, just as the adversary
must collect the data from both the email provider and key escrow server, neither of these
parties alone has enough information to unilaterally steal the user’s sensitive data.
When classifying the security of a system against this threat model, there are four
possible classification: satisfies the threat model when the third-party entities—email provider
and optional key server—are fully-malicious, satisfies the threat model when those entities are
sometimes-malicious, satisfies the threat model when those entities are honest-but-curious,
and does not satisfy the threat model. We prefer this fine-grained classification, as it allows
more precision in discussing the security of a system. This is important because a system that
only protects against some adversarial models (e.g., honest-but-curious) may be sufficient for
some use cases and have higher usability than systems which protect against more malicious
models.

2.3

Related Work

Whitten and Tygar [30] conducted the first formal user study of a secure email system
(i.e., PGP 5), which uncovered serious usability issues with key management and users’
understanding of the underlying public key cryptography. They found that a majority of
users were unable to successfully send encrypted email in the context of a hypothetical
political campaign scenario. The results of their study took the security community by
surprise and helped shape modern usable security research.
Seven years later, Sheng at al. demonstrated that despite improvements made to PGP
(i.e., PGP 9), key management was still a challenge for users [24]. Furthermore, they showed

7

that in the new version of PGP, encryption and decryption had become so transparent that
users were unsure if a message they received had actually been encrypted.
Garfinkel and Miller created a secure email system using S/MIME and used this
system to replicate Whitten and Tygar’s earlier study [10]. Their work demonstrated that
automating key management provides significant usability gains compared to earlier studies
that burdened users with key management tasks. Still, they observed that their tool “was a
little too transparent” in how well it integrated with Outlook Express, and sometimes users
failed to read the instructions accompanying the visual indicators.
Ruoti et al. used IBE to explore the design principles necessary to create usable,
secure email. In their first study, they demonstrated that users strongly preferred that
secure email be tightly integrated with their existing email systems [16]. In a continuation
of this work, Ruoti et al. demonstrated that usability could be further enhanced by adding
context-sensitive inline tutorials, artificial delays on encryption while users are instructed
regarding the security of their messages, and contextual clues inserted into the underlying
webmail interfaces [20]. In our systems, we adopt the features discussed by Ruoti et al.
and evaluate whether they are beneficial to non-IBE-based secure email (i.e., PGP- and
password-based).
Atwater et al. evaluated the usability of PGP using a mocked secure email tool
that automatically generates key pairs for users, shares the generated public key with a
key server, and retrieves the recipient’s public key as needed. Their results showed that
with these modifications, users could successfully use PGP to send and receive secure email.
Unfortunately, their mock-up did not correctly simulate PGP’s key management, failing to
require users to wait for their recipients to establish key pairs before they could be sent email.
This makes it unclear if their positive results are valid, as this is one of PGP’s pain points.
In our PGP-based system, we adopt many of the usability features introduced in Atwater et
al.’s system, but unlike Atwater et al. we fully implement PGP key management. This allows

8

us to test whether PGP-based secure email can be usable by novices, or whether Atwater et
al.’s result was an artifact of their incomplete simulation of PGP.
Bai et al. explored user attitudes towards different models for obtaining a recipient’s
public key in PGP [2]. In their study, they built two PGP-based secure email systems, one
that used the traditional key exchange model,7 and one that used a registration model based
on a key directory.8 Users were provided with instructions on how to use each tool and given
several tasks to complete. Afterwards, participants shared their opinions regarding the key
exchange models. The results of this study showed that, overall, individuals preferred the
key directory-based registration model, though they were not averse to the traditional key
exchange model either. In our study we adopt the key directory model, which was found to
be preferable by Bai et al. Unlike our work, Bai et al.’s study only gathered data on user
attitudes regarding key management, and did not evaluate their usability.
Ruoti et al. developed a novel paired-participant methodology for evaluating the
usability of secure email [19]. Unlike other methodologies that have participants interact
with study coordinators, this methodology brought in pairs of participants and observed
whether these users could collaboratively begin using secure email. Each pair of participants
were required to know each other before the study, better simulating how grassroots adoption
of secure email would likely progress. Their results showed that this methodology was
preferable to past methodologies for several reasons: first, users acted more naturally during
the study; second, it identified additional pain points in the systems tested, that would not
have surfaced in a traditional study; third, the methodology allowed researchers to observe
both a) participants who are introducing their friends to secure email, and b) participants
who are being introduced to secure email. In our study, we use this methodology to evaluate
the systems we built.

7

In this model, users must manually exchange their public keys with each other. This model is based on
the idea of a “web of trust.”
8
In this model, users prove their identity to a trusted third-party key directory, which will then host their
public key. Senders can then look up a recipient’s public key in this directory.

9

Chapter 3
Secure Email Systems

To compare the usability of PGP-, IBE-, and password-based secure email, we developed secure email prototypes that were each implemented with one of these key management
approaches. To ensure that the interface and functionality of each prototype would be largely
identical, we built each using the MessageGuard platform. This allowed us to conduct an
A/B evaluation of each system, which restricted variations to intrinsic properties of the key
management schemes we were testing. While not described below, we also conducted several
cognitive walkthroughs and pilot studies to refine the usability of MessageGuard as a whole,
and each of the three secure email variants individually.
In this section, we first describe the MessageGuard platform including the overall
system look and feel. We then describe the three secure email variants we developed: PGP,
IBE, and Passwords. For each of these, we describe the security model of the key management
scheme as well as interface elements and functionality that are unique to each version. Each of
these systems is available for testing at https://{pgp,ibe,passwords}.messageguard.io
and source code for each system is available at
https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard-WebClient.
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Figure 3.1: Composition Overlay in MessageGuard.
3.1

The MessageGuard Platform

The MessageGuard platform [21]1 is designed to allow researchers to rapidly prototype secure
email systems.2 These prototypes can then be deployed as browser extensions in all major
browsers except IE. By building systems using MessageGuard, it is easy to ensure that
the systems have overall identical interfaces and functionality, an important factor in A/B
studies. MessageGuard also has support for pluggable key management, simplifying our job
in developing the three secure email systems. In the remainder of this subsection we give a
high level description of MessageGuard; for further details regarding its security we invite
readers to refer to the MessageGuard paper [21].
1

https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard
MessageGuard supports adding content-based encryption to most applications on the Web, and not just
secure email.
2
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Figure 3.2: Read Overlay in MessageGuard.
MessageGuard tightly integrates with existing web applications—in this case Gmail—
using security overlays [28]. Security overlays function by replacing portions of Gmail’s
interface with secure interfaces that are inaccessible to Gmail. Users then interact with these
secure overlays to create and read encrypted email (composition–Figure 3.1, read–Figure 3.2).
The overlays themselves use a distinctive color scheme to help users identify them as the
interfaces to use when encrypting their email.
In addition to the distinctive interface, MessageGuard incorporates the design principles
identified by Ruoti et al. as being necessary for secure email to be usable [16, 20]. First, when a
message is encrypted, an artificial delay is added to this process; during the delay participants
are shown informative text helping them understand how their message is being protected.
Second, MessageGuard includes context-sensitive, inline tutorials that appear the first time a
user initiates a specific task; research has shown that tutorials employing this style are more
effective at getting users to read and understand them [19, 20]. Third, MessageGuard uses
automatic encryption, but briefly shows users ciphertext as part of encryption and decryption,
helping users feel confident that their messages have been encrypted. Fourth, users can
include an unencrypted greeting with their secure email, helping their friends have confidence
to install MessageGuard and decrypt the email. Fifth, encrypted emails contain information
that help non-MessageGuard-users know how to set up and get started with MessageGuard.
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Whoops! One or more of your recipients hasn’t installed MessageGuard yet. Click here to send
them a message requesting that they install MessageGuard.
Once your recipient has installed MessageGuard, you will be able to encrypt messages for them. In
the meantime, feel free to close this message and it’ll be saved as a draft.

Figure 3.3: Error Shown to PGP Users when Encrypting Message for Recipient Without
Public Key Available in the Key Directory.
Hey,
I want to send you an an encrypted message using
MessageGuard, but I need you to install it first.
Here’s what you’ll need to do:
1. Go to MessageGuard.io/pgp and sign up for an account.
2. Download and install MessageGuard.
3. Let me know when you’ve set it up, and I’ll send you my
encrypted message.
Hope that helps!

Figure 3.4: Invitation Email Generated to Invite Recipient to Install PGP.
3.2

PGP

One of the best known approaches for providing end-to-end encryption is Pretty Good Privacy [9], better known by its acronym PGP. PGP was developed in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman,
and allows users to encrypt and sign their email messages using public key cryptography. In
PGP, users generate a key pair and can then share their public key in a number of ways, such
as sending the key directly to other users, posting the key to a personal website, or uploading
the key to a key directory.
PGP actually has a variety of valid configurations—for example, public keys can be
verified using a web-of-trust, the certificate authority system, or by retrieval from a trusted
key directory. In line with work by Atwater et al. and Bai et al., we chose a configuration
that maximized usability, while still maintaining the most important security features: First,
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keys are shared using a key directory [2]; users verify that they have permission to upload
a key by creating an account at the key directory and verifying their email address using
email-based identification and authentication [27]. Second, a user’s private key is only stored
on their local computer, but it is not password encrypted [1]. Third, if a user attempts
to send an email to a recipient who hasn’t yet uploaded a public key to the key directory,
the user is prompted to send an email to the recipient with instructions on how to set up
MessageGuard [1] (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). The design of our PGP system satisfies
our threat model when third-party entities are sometimes-malicious, though we do note that
there would be a need to monitor the key directory (e.g., with CONIKS [13]).
The following is the workflow for our MessageGuard–PGP system, for a new user
sending email to a non-user.
1. The user visits the MessageGuard website. They are instructed to create an account
with their email address. Their address is then verified by having the user click a link
in an email sent to them. They are then able to download MessageGuard–PGP.
2. After installation, the user is told that the system will generate a PGP key pair for
them. The public key is automatically uploaded to the key directory, as the user is
already authenticated to the key directory from the previous step.
3. The user attempts to send an encrypted email, but is informed the recipient hasn’t yet
installed the system (see Figure 3.3). They are then prompted to send their recipient
an email inviting them to install MessageGuard–PGP (see Figure 3.4).
4. Once the recipient has installed MessageGuard–PGP, which generates and publishes
their public key, they inform the sender that they are ready to proceed. The sender
can now finish encrypting the email for the recipient.
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3.3

IBE

Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a public key system wherein a user’s public key is simply
their email address [23]. Private keys are generated by a trusted third-party key server, which
authenticates the identity of the user before providing them with their private key. IBE
satisfies our threat model when third-party entities are honest-but-curious. As compared to
PGP, IBE is less secure, but potentially more usable—IBE allows anyone to be sent secure
email, regardless of whether they have already installed MessageGuard.
The workflow for MessageGuard–IBE is as follows:
1. The user visits the MessageGuard website. They are instructed to create an account
with their email address. Their address is then verified by having the user click a link
in an email sent to them. They are then able to download MessageGuard–IBE.
2. After installation, the user is told that the system will retrieve their IBE key from the
key server. This happens automatically, as the user is already authenticated to the key
server from the previous step.
3. The sender is able to send encrypted email to any address.

3.4

Passwords

Password-based encryption refers to allowing a user to select a password that will be used to
encrypt their email.3 This approach satisfies our threat model when third-parties are fullymalicious, and has the highest theoretical security of the three systems we built. Practically,
the security of password-based encryption is limited by the strength of the user-chosen
passwords and security of the out-of-band channels use to communicate those password. For
example, if users choose easy-to-guess passwords, then an attacker could obtain an encrypted
message and then brute force the password.
3
The password is transformed into a symmetric encryption key using a password-based key derivation
function.
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Figure 3.5: Dialog for Entering a New Password with Which to Encrypt Email.
The MessageGuard–Passwords workflow is as follows:
1. The user visits the MessageGuard website. They are prompted to download
MessageGuard–Passwords.
2. After installation, the system is immediately ready to work.
3. When the user attempts to send an encrypted email, they are informed that they need
to create a password with which to encrypt the email (see Figure 3.5). After creating
the password, the user can then send their encrypted email.
4. The user must communicate to the recipient the password used to encrypt the email
message. This should happen over an out-of-band (i.e., non-email) channel.
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Chapter 4
Key Management

In this section we describe the design and implementation of key management for
MessageGuard. We will first cover the overall architecture of key management, followed by a
description of the internals for each of the implemented key management schemes. Finally,
we will address some solutions to engineering challenges that we designed and implemented.

4.1

Architecture

MessageGuard’s key management is designed in an object-oriented manner. Encryption
keys are represented as instances of a key scheme. These instances implement the base
cryptographic operations required to secure messages according to their respective key
management schemes. The basic architecture is presented in Figure 4.1.
For performance reasons, MessageGuard does not utilize these key management
schemes to encrypt the entire message contents. To encryt a message, a random AES key
is generated, designated as the message key. This key is used to symmetrically encrypt the
contents of the message, and it is this key that is encrypted with whatever particular key
management scheme MessageGuard is configured to use.1 The application of message keys is
the approach taken by most secure email systems.
1

This approach is most beneficial with IBE, because encryption with that scheme is quite slow relative to
other schemes.
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Figure 4.1: MessageGuard Key Management Framework
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4.1.1

Key Manager

The KeyManager is a singleton and acts as the main interface for the rest of MessageGuard
key management. It is responsible for fetching KeySystems from storage and using them to
perform encryption and decryption operations.

4.1.2

Key UI Manager

KeyUIManager instances are responsible for managing the user interface presented to users
when creating encryption keys, and editing existing keys. This class directly manages common
UI elements—the key name field, key color button, and save/create buttons. UI elements
specific to the particular key management schemes are managed by their KeyScheme instance.

4.1.3

Key Storage

KeyStorage is responsible for encryption key storage and retrieval. It is implemented as a
simple key-value store, backed by localStorage. The “key” for each encryption key is that
key’s fingerprint—see Section 4.3 for details on fingerprint generation.

4.2

Key Schemes

We implemented key management schemes for PGP, IBE, and passwords.

4.2.1

PGP

The PGP key management scheme is implemented on top of OpenPGP.js.2 MessageGuard
uses this library to generate a PGP key pair, and then stores that key pair in key storage. The
public key is then published to the PGP key directory, provided the user has authenticated
with the key directory and proved ownership of their identity.
2

https://openpgpjs.org
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To improve usability, PGP private keys are not password-protected. Instead of
enforcing password protection for PGP keys alone, we can introduce password protection of
these keys through the use of a master password, as described in Section 6.5.
When encrypting a message key, MessageGuard will query the key server for the
recipient’s public key. It will use this public key to encrypt the message, after using its own
private key to sign it. Recipients will look up the sender’s public key to verify this signature.3

4.2.2

IBE

The IBE key management scheme is implemented on top of ibejs.4 Users provide their
identity to MessageGuard, which queries the IBE key escrow server to retrieve the private
key associated with that identity. The key escrow server will verify that the user has an
authenticated session and has proved ownership of that identity before replying with both
the private key and the public parameters necessary for generating public keys for other
identities.
When encrypting a message key, MessageGuard will generate a public key for the
recipient, then use it to encrypt the key. Currently, ibejs does not support message signing,
so our IBE implementation does not yet support sender identity verification. Including this
functionality would not be a large undertaking, however.

4.2.3

Passwords

The password-based key management scheme is implemented on top of the PBKDF2 algorithm.5
Users supply passwords to be used for symmetric encryption. These passwords are used to
derive encryption keys, which are stored in key storage.6 The PBKDF2 algorithm is used to
3

While the email transport mechanism reveals email metadata, MessageGuard’s design anonymizes
message sender identities; this allows MessageGuard to facilitate use cases such as a dead drop. To inform
recipients which identity should be used to look up the public key from the key server for signature verification,
the sender’s identity is encrypted along with the message key. Only the recipient will be able to read this
identity.
4
https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/ibejs
5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2
6
MessageGuard discards the original password value.
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derive these keys, with 5000 rounds of iteration.7 These symmetric encryption keys are used
to encrypt the message keys.

4.3

Fingerprints

To assist MessageGuard on a recipient’s machine in selecting the right key to decrypt a
message, a “fingerprint” is attached to each outgoing message that identifies which encryption
key can decrypt the message. This concept is widely used in PGP key distribution and
verification; each key pair has a short fingerprint based on the public key, which users can
verify when establishing trust in a public key.
Each key management scheme in MessageGuard handles fingerprints differently. PGP
generates fingerprints as the hash of the public key. IBE generates fingerprints as the hash
of both the identity (e.g. email address) and the public parameters of the IBE key escrow
server.
Using passwords presents a problem for generating key fingerprints. PGP and IBE
are both public key schemes, so the fingerprint reveals nothing about the private key used
to decrypt messages. However, because password encryption is symmetric, if we were to
use the hash of the password as the fingerprint we would allow anyone with access to that
fingerprint the ability to brute-force the original password value. However, since the fingerprint
accompanies the encrypted ciphertext, and anyone with access to that ciphertext can launch
a brute-force attack to learn the password, no new vulnerability would be introduced. We
therefore implemented password fingerprints as the bcrypt hash of the password.
Since bcrypt generates a random salt with each hash, the recipient cannot simply
take the bcrypt hash of an existing password and compare it to an incoming fingerprint
to see whether that password will be able to decrypt a given message. In addition, once
7

Many security products use more rounds, (http://security.stackexchange.com/q/3959) but the
JavaScript-based implementation of PBKDF2 we use is incapable of completing a higher number of rounds
in a reasonable amount of time. In the future we could adjust this value, or allow users to make this
security-usability tradoff themselves.
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a recipient has already set up a password key, that original password value will have been
discarded, and cannot be used with bcrypt to compare its hash to the incoming fingerprint.
Therefore, recipients will not be able to confirm whether any existing password keys
can decrypt a message. As a result, when users receive their first password-encrypted message
from a given sender, MessageGuard always prompts the recipient that they need to enter a
password to decrypt that message, regardless of whether that user might have already stored
a decryption password identical to the password used by the sender.
When recipients enter a potential password to use for decryption, MessageGuard will
confirm it can decrypt the message by checking it against the incoming fingerprint. The
bcrypt salt is extracted, and used with the password value as inputs to bcrypt. If the given
password matches the password used by the sender to encrypt the message, the output of
bcrypt will match the hash contained in the incoming fingerprint.
At this stage, MessageGuard must ensure that the encryption key derived from the
password is identical to that derived by the sender. The key derivation function, PBKDF2,
also utilizes a random salt. If the recipient derives an encryption key using a salt that differs
from that used by the sender, the passwords might match but the encryption keys will not,
and the receiver will be unable to decrypt their message.
To resolve this, both the sender and recipient use the bcrypt salt as the salt provided
to PBKDF2. This ensures that both parties can generate the same encryption key from the
same password.8

4.4

Key Generation

To improve usability, we hide as many key management details from users as possible. This
includes PGP key generation and IBE key retrieval. Upon startup, MessageGuard queries
the key server for the user’s current state: whether the user is logged in, and if so what
8

Note that this does not cause password-based key derivation to be deterministic for all parties. Salts are
allowed to be randomly generated when a sender enters a new encryption password. Recipients are simply
forced to use the same salt as the sender to generate their bcrypt and PBKDF2 output.
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identities have been verified by the key server. For each of these identities, keys are generated
or fetched, for PGP or IBE respectively.9
In order for key autogeneration to succeed, we had to ensure that users would have
already registered with the key server and validated an identity prior to installing and
running the MessageGuard extension; otherwise, the key server would refuse to accept a
generated PGP key and refuse to supply a user’s IBE private key. To ensure that first-time
MessageGuard users are already authenticated to the key server, we designed the landing
page to force visitors to register for an account and validate an identity before presenting
them with an extension download link. Since this link is only presented after the user has
registered and proved an identity, keys for that identity can be generated by MessageGuard
immediately upon startup.10
During implementation, we had to ensure that the extension would be able to make
authenticated AJAX requests to the key server’s API. To do this, we instructed MessageGuard’s key initialization code to include cookies with AJAX calls to the key server. On
the key server, we configured CORS11 to accept incoming requests from the MessageGuard
extension, and allow cookies within those requests to be used for authentication.

4.5

Session Storage

When designing MessageGuard, we wanted to avoid training users to enter passwords into
potentially malicious web pages. If our tool provided in-page password fields, this would
broaden the attack surface for a phishing attack. As such, MessageGuard opens a new window
that contains all necessary interface elements for users to enter encryption or decryption keys.
For example, the password-based encryption variant presents Figure 3.5 in a new window,
and not as part of a MessageGuard overlay.
9

PGP key generation uses window.crypto.getRandomValues as a source for strong random numbers.
This function has wide support across major browsers.
10
Currently, MessageGuard does not support multiple users. All encryption keys are available to any user
of the browser.
11
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-origin_resource_sharing
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This approach became problematic when we wanted to introduce short-term encryption
keys. For example, instead of storing encryption passwords forever, we wanted to allow these
passwords to be purged from memory after the user closes their browser window. In addition,
if we were to implement MessageGuard with a master password that protects all stored
encryption keys, this master password would also need to be evicted after the user completed
their session.
The problem arose because sessionStorage, the native browser storage object that
is designed to store short-term data, does not allow cross-window shared storage. Each
window or tab receives its own session storage area. If key storage were to add an encryption
key to the sessionStorage object while running on a separate window, the original window with MessageGuard security overlays would be unable to read that key from its own
sessionStorage. Similarly, a master password entered in one window would be unable to
be used to protect keys created in another window.
To implement shared-yet-ephemeral storage, we rapidly prototyped four variants. Each
suffers from drawbacks, some debilitating. The final variant has the most advantages and is
the version that is integrated within MessageGuard in our study.
• The first variant operated by using localStorage as a persistence layer, and clearing
the contents during the onbeforeunload event, signifying that the window was about
to close. The contents are only cleared, however, if the window being closed is the
last window left open. This is done by maintaining a count of all open MessageGuard
windows. Whenever a MessageGuard window loads, it advertises this to all other
open MessageGuard windows, which then increment their in-memory count; these
advertisements are broadcast as storage events. MessageGuard window closures trigger
a similar notification, which results in each remaining window decrementing their
counter.
This approach suffers from two major drawbacks. First, onbeforeunload handlers are
used to present a confirmation message to users, allowing them to cancel closing a window.
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Modifications of localStorage are not guaranteed to succeed before the window closed.
As such when a MessageGuard window closes and attempts to broadcast this event to
the other active windows through a storage event, that event is not guaranteed to fire.
If any window fails to broadcast their closure, the in-memory count of active windows
maintained by other MessageGuard instances will cease being accurate; when the last
MessageGuard window closes, it will erroneously believe that there is at least one more
active window, and will refuse to evict the contents of localStorage.
Even if windows can consistently broadcast their closure, when only two MessageGuard
windows are active and both are closed at once, they will both believe that another
window will remain open, and will refuse to clear localStorage.
• The second variant addresses some failings in the first by eschewing the utilization
of the onbeforeunload event, in favor of a complex coordination system where each
active MessageGuard window is in frequent communication with each other. One
“master window” is responsible for tracking how many other MessageGuard windows
are currently responding to heartbeats. When the count reaches zero, localStorage is
cleared, while its contents remain in memory. When this master window closes, the
contents are lost.
If the master window closes while it is not the last window left alive, the remaining
MessageGuard windows utilize a stochastic process to “elect” a new master window, in
a first-come-first-serve basis. Essentially, each window waits a random amount of time
before electing itself as the new master window. The first MessageGuard window to
perform this is recognized as the new master window by the rest.
This approach is susceptible to race conditions. One window may elect itself as the
master window and broadcast this to the rest of the waiting windows, while in the
meantime another window also elects itself, before having received the broadcast message
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from the first window. Both would believe they are the master window, and resolving
this would prove difficult.
Additionally, like the first variant this option fails to operate properly when all active
windows close simultaneously. No window would have the opportunity to note that it
is the only window left alive, and localStorage would not be cleared.
• The third variant keeps all session storage in memory. When a new MessageGuard
window loads, it broadcasts a request for the current contents of session storage to all
currently-active windows. If a response is received, this new window then populates
its session storage contents with the data in the response. Any modifications to this
in-memory store are also broadcast to all active instances. Any window that closes
leaves no trace of this store on disk, and when the last window closes the contents are
lost.
While this approach is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of session storage, we found
that—from a user’s perspective—it is a bit too eager to clear its contents. If a user
loads MessageGuard in their email provider and provides a decryption key to read their
mail, then reloads their email tab, the session storage clears itself, since it only exists
in memory and no other MessageGuard window was active to maintain its state.
• We realized at this point that Chrome did provide a native storage object that fulfills
the requirements for MessageGuard: session cookies. These cookies are ephemeral,
clearing themselves after the browser window closes; and they allow cross-window
sharing of data. Unfortunately, cookies are not suitable for storing large amounts
of data. To use the large storage capacity of localStorage with the ephemerality
of session cookies, we applied symmetric AES encryption. Upon startup, a random
AES key is generated and placed in a session cookie, which is configured to be visible
across the MessageGuard extension origin. This key is used to encrypt data placed in
localStorage. Any MessageGuard window that opens in the same session has access to
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this AES key, and is able to decrypt data retrieved from localStorage, giving it access
to the current state of session storage. When the browser closes, the localStorage
contents persist, but the encryption key necessary to read these contents is lost. The
next time MessageGuard opens and attempts to read the contents of session storage, it
will be unable to do so and will behave as if that data does not exist.
This appraoch fulfills all requirements of session storage, and behaves well for users.
As such, it is the approach adopted for MessageGuard during the study, and is the
persistence layer used for password-based secure email.
One drawback to this approach is that, since the AES key is stored in a session cookie,
that key will be transmitted along with every HTTP resource request to the domain
used by MessageGuard. Since MessageGuard is deployed as a browser extension, these
requests never travel over the network and the key is not made visible to any third
party. If MessageGuard were to be deployed as a bookmarklet and run from a dedicated
domain, that domain would have access to the ephemeral encryption key. However,
without access to the contents of localStorage, the key has no use. And since the
security model of MessageGuard as a bookmarklet requires trusting the dedicated
domain (since this domain is responsible for serving up all MessageGuard code), the
risk of exposing the ephemeral AES encryption key to that server is minimal.

4.6

Concurrency

In Chrome, all iframes on the same origin run on the same thread. This also applies to
extension domains. Since key manager operations can be computationally expensive, we
needed to have key management run in its own thread. In Chrome, this is accomplished
by utilizing web workers. These web worker theads are initialized by passing the URL
of a JavaScript file to the WebWorker constructor. Communication with this thread is
implemented as simple message passing.
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To implement key management as a web worker, we created a module with a collection
of key management “tasks”. These include encrypting a message key, encrypting a draft,
performing decryption, and responding to heartbeat requests. This module is required by a
“thread message responder” module, which is the target script provided to the WebWorker
constructor. A “thread message transmitter” module passes requests to the web worker, and
awaits responses from that thread.
When migrating the key management codebase to run in the context of a web worker,
a major issue we encountered was the unavailability of local storage and cookies. Local
storage is widely used across key management—for key storage, advertising the creation of a
key, or implementing session storage. The latter of these also relies heavily on cookies. In the
web worker environment, these objects did not exist.
To resolve this, we implemented a proxy that passes commands or requests between
the main origin thread and a web worker thread. The worker thread is able to request, set, or
delete local storage or cookie data from this proxy, and broadcast or subscribe to local storage
events. This proxy used Promises12 to allow asynchronous inter-thread communication.
We wanted to ensure that key management could function properly even if it were to
run in a browser where web workers is not available. To allow this, by default key management
loads as a “web worker loader”, with only enough know-how to initialize a web worker and
pass it requests. If this loader detects that web workers are not available, it reloads itself in
“stand-alone” mode, with all key management code available. In this mode, concurrency will
not be available, but key management will still function normally.
Since key management may run in either a worker thread or the main origin thread,
the local storage and cookie proxy interfaces must be identical to that of the native versions.
Although native local storage and cookies are accessed synchronously, we introduced an
indirection layer that exposes these objects’ APIs with Promises. In this way, key management
12

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/
Promise
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can access local storage and cookies using Promises, regardless of whether it runs in a worker
thread or the main origin thread.
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Chapter 5
Design Iteration

As part of the engineering effort toward implementing MessageGuard, we evaluated
our design decisions through the use of pilot studies and a cognitive walkthrough. Over the
course of these studies, we gained valuable insight on the usability impact of our approaches,
and were able to make changes that significantly improved the usability of MessageGuard.

5.1

Pilot Studies

Once the MessageGuard system was sufficiently implemented so as to be functional, we
conducted a number of pilot studies with friends and family. These studies where highly
informal, and consisted of simply attempting to use the system to send an encrypted message.
All pilot study participants were successfully able to send and receive encrypted messages.
There were four minor changes that arose from these studies. First, we introduced more
“friendly”, colloquial wording to the system’s status and error messages. For example, Figure
3.3 illustrates the error message shown to PGP users when attempting to encrypt messages
for users that had no public key registered to the MessageGuard key server. Previously, this
was a rather stark error message, reading, “This recipient has not installed MessageGuard.
Before you can send them encrypted messages, they must be registered. Have them visit
MessageGuard.io/pgp to download and install the MessageGuard tool.” One pilot study
participant felt unease at this message, and as a result we expanded it to include instructions
on waiting for recipients to register before trying again; we also included reassurances that

30

Figure 5.1: Instructions for Pwm and Early Iterations of MessageGuard.
the message draft has been saved, and the user should feel free to close the message and come
back to it later.
Second, we received feedback on the instructions included in an encrypted email,
indicating that it was not visually well-designed. These instructions, inherited from Pwm [20]
and presented in Figure 5.1, provide directions for non-MessageGuard-users on how to proceed
with decrypting their encrypted email. As a result of this feedback, we redesigned these
instructions and stripped them down to the bare essentials. The results of this effort are
presented in Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.2: Revised Instructions for MessageGuard-encrypted Messages.
Third, we gained evidence that the password name field was non-obvious and would
need to be made optional. The password entry form, presented in Figure 3.5, gives users the
option to name their encryption passwords, to help them differentiate between them when
encrypting email for different parties. Pilot study participants never voluntarily interacted
with this field, and questioned its purpose. As a result of this, MessageGuard’s key creation
was altered to allow nameless keys, which would be given default names differentiated by a
numeral suffix (e.g. “Encryption Password”, “Encryption Password (2)”).
Finally, we noted that the term “key” appeared in multiple contexts within MessageGuard. This was problematic, as we never introduced users to this term, nor provided any
context for users to understand how encryption keys are used in general. MessageGuard was
designed to be as usable as possible; ensuring user understanding was not a design goal. As
such, we decided to restructure MessageGuard’s labeling to avoid using this term, in favor of
terms such as “encryption password”.
We did not validate the effectiveness of these changes with pilot study participants.
We took the feedback received from these pilot studies and applied the changes we believed
were necessary to address the issues observed.
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Figure 5.3: MessageGuard Initialization Modal
5.2

Cognitive Walkthrough

The cognitive walkthrough [29] is a formal method for exposing potential usability hurdles in
a system. Conducted by system designers, the cognitive walkthrough is organized into tasks
that users will need to perform. Each task consists of a list of correct actions. At each step,
the system designers will consider what action a user might take, based on available clues
and past instructions. Designers note if a typical user would deviate from the correct action.
Based on these notes, designers can improve the usability of their system by addressing the
mistakes users would make in using their system.
We conducted a cognitive walkthrough of MessageGuard, and made one major change
as a result of this walkthrough, having to do with the initialization process. As described
in Section 4.4, MessageGuard will auto-generate PGP keys, and auto-fetch IBE keys, upon
startup. This vastly simplifies the instructions a user needs to send to a recipient who has
not installed MessageGuard yet and needs to generate PGP keys. All the recipient has to do
is install MessageGuard and then start it once; at that point, the recipient’s PGP keys are
automatically generated, and the sender can proceed with encrypting email for that recipient.
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Prior to the cognitive walkthrough, MessageGuard would not “start up” until it was
loaded as an overlay, for the purposes of displaying or composing an encrypted message.
Only once a user loaded MessageGuard in order to read or write a message would the key
autogeneration take place. The problem with this approach was that it was possible for a
recipient to believe they had properly installed MessageGuard without having performed key
initialization. If recipients notify the sender that they have installed MessageGuard—which
they have—without ever having loaded MessageGuard as an overlay, the recipient’s PGP key
will not have been generated and published. At that point, the sender would try to encrypt
for the recipient and be unable to do so, even though both sender and recipient have installed
MessageGuard.
Essentially, the installation phase and key generation phase were separate stages.
To address this, we extended installation to include key generation. Upon installation of
MessageGuard, an initialization window opens. This window is responsible for carrying out
key generation, and is presented in Figure 5.3. By funneling users through this initialization
window, we are able to ensure that all users who complete MessageGuard installation will
also have completed key generation, preventing the issue described above. A further benefit
of the initialization window is that it explicitly informs users that MessageGuard has been
installed. Before the initialization window was introduced, users would need to visit Gmail
before they received confirmation that MessageGuard had been correctly installed.
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Chapter 6
Methodology

We conducted an IRB-approved user study wherein pairs of participants used secure
email to communicate sensitive information to each other. Our study methodology is taken
from work by Ruoti et al. [19]. We use this methodology for its various benefits and because
it allows us to compare the results from our systems with the results produced by Ruoti et al.
In the remainder of this section we give an overview of the study and describe its
scenario, tasks, study questionnaire, and post-study interview. In addition, we discuss the
development and limitations of the study.

6.1

Study Setup

The study ran for two and a half weeks—beginning Monday, May 23, 2016 and ending
Tuesday, June 7, 2016. In total, 55 pairs of participants (110 total participants) took the
study. Due to various reasons discussed later in this section, we excluded results from eight
participant pairs. For the remainder of this paper, we refer exclusively to the remaining 47
pairs (94 participants).
Participants took between fifty and sixty-five minutes to complete the study, and each
participant was compensated $15 USD for their participation. Participants were required to
be accompanied by a friend, who served as their counterpart for the study. For standardization
and to satisfy requirements of the systems tested in the study, both participants were required
to use their own Gmail accounts.
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When participants arrived, they were given a consent form to sign, detailing the study
and their rights as participants. Participants were informed that they would be in separate
rooms during the study and would use email to communicate with each other. Participants
were also informed that a study coordinator would be with them at all times and could
answer any questions they might have.
Using a coin flip, one participant was randomly assigned as Participant A (referred
to as “Johnny” throughout the paper) and the other as Participant B (referred to as “Jane”
throughout the paper). The participants were then led to the appropriate room to begin the
study; each room had identical equipment. For the remainder of the study, all instructions
were provided in written form. Participants completed the task on a virtual machine, which
was restored to a common snapshot after each study task, ensuring that the computer started
in the same state for all participants and that no participant information was inadvertently
stored.
During the study, participants were asked to complete a multi-stage task three times,
once for each of the secure email systems being tested: PGP, IBE, and Passwords. The order
in which the participants used the systems was randomized.

6.2

Demographics

We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university, as well as through Craigslist.
Participants were evenly split between male and female: male (47; 50%), female (47; 50%).
Participants skewed young: 18 to 24 years old (75; 80%), 25 to 34 years old (18; 19%), 35 to
44 years old (1; 1%).
We distributed posters across campus to avoid biasing our participants towards any
particular major. Most participants were college students: high school graduates (1; 1%),
undergraduate students (71; 76%), college graduates (15; 16%), graduate students (7; 7%).
Participants were enrolled in a variety of majors, including both technical and non-technical
majors.
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6.3

Scenario Design

During the study, participants were asked to role-play a scenario about completing taxes.
Johnny was told that his friend, Jane, had graduated in accounting and was going to help
Johnny prepare his taxes. To do so, Johnny needed to send her his social security number
and his last year’s tax PIN. Johnny was told that because this information was sensitive,
he should encrypt it using a secure email system we gave him.1 Jane was told that she
would receive some information regarding taxes from Johnny, but was not informed that the
information would be encrypted.

6.4

Task Design

Based on the scenario, participants were asked to complete a two-stage task.
1. Johnny would encrypt and send his SSN and last year’s tax PIN to Jane.
2. Jane would decrypt this information, then reply to Johnny with a confirmation code
and this year’s tax PIN. The reply was required to be encrypted. After Johnny received
this information, he would inform Jane that he had received the necessary information,
and then the task would end.2 .
During each stage, participants were provided with worksheets containing instructions
regarding the task and space for participants to record the sensitive information they received.3
Both participants were provided with the information they would send (e.g., SSN and PIN),
but were told to treat this information as they would their own sensitive information.
Participants completed the same task for each of the three systems being tested.
Before beginning any tasks, participants were informed that other than the sensitive
information they were provided, which would need to be transmitted over email, they were
1

Johnny was provided a URL for the secure email system to use.
This confirmation step is added to ensure that Johnny could decrypt Jane’s message. We did not require
the confirmation message to be encrypted.
3
These instructions did not include directions on how to use any of the systems.
2
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free to communicate with each other however they normally would. Additionally, participants
were informed that they could browse the Internet, use their phones, or engage in other
similar activities while waiting for email from their friend. This was done to provide a more
natural setting for the participants, and to avoid frustration if participants had to wait for
an extended period of time while their friend figured out an encrypted email system.
Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related to the study but were not
allowed to provide instructions on how to use any of the systems being tested. If participants
became confused regarding the system, coordinators would tell them that they could answer
questions regarding the task, but could not describe how to use the systems being tested.

6.5

Study Questionnaire

We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-based survey software. As part of this
survey, participants answered a set of demographic questions.
Immediately upon completing the study task for a given secure email system, participants were asked several questions related to their experience with that system. First,
participants completed the ten questions from the System Usability Scale (SUS) [5, 6]. Multiple studies have shown that SUS is a good indicator of perceived usability [26], is consistent
across populations [18], and has been used in the past to rate secure email systems [1, 16, 19].
After providing a SUS score, participants were asked to describe what they liked about each
system, what they would change, and why they would change it.
After completing the task and questions for all three secure email systems, participants
were asked to select which of the encrypted email systems they had used was their favorite,
and to describe why they liked this system. Participants were next asked to rate the following
statements using a five-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree): “I want to be
able to encrypt my email,” and “I would encrypt email frequently.”
Finally, the survey told participants that MessageGuard could be enhanced with a
master password, which they would be required to enter before MessageGuard would function.
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This would help protect their sensitive messages from other individuals who might also
use the same computer. After reading the description about adding a master password to
MessageGuard, users were asked to describe whether they would want this feature and why
they felt that way.

6.6

Post-Study Interview

After completing the survey, participants were interviewed by their respective study coordinators. The coordinators asked participants about their general impressions of the study and
the secure email systems they had used. Furthermore, the coordinators were instructed to
note when the participants struggled or had other interesting events occur, and during the
post-study interview the coordinators reviewed and further explored these events with the
participants.
To assess whether participants understood the security provided by each secure email
system, coordinators questioned participants regarding what an attacker would need to do to
read their encrypted messages. Coordinators would continue probing participants’ answers
until they were confident whether or not the user correctly understood the security model of
each system.
After describing their perceived security models, participants were then read short
descriptions detailing the actual security models of each system. Participants were encouraged
to ask questions if they wanted further clarification for any of the described models. After
hearing these descriptions, participants were then asked to indicate whether their opinions
regarding any of the systems had changed. Participants were also asked whether they would
change their answer regarding their favorite system on the survey.
Upon completion of the post-study interview, participants were brought together for
a final post-study interview. First, participants were asked to share their opinions on doing a
study with a friend, as opposed to a traditional study. Second, participants were asked to
describe their ideal secure email system. While participants are not system designers, we
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hoped that this question might elicit responses that participants had not yet felt comfortable
sharing.

6.7

Quality Control

We excluded responses from eight pairs of participants.4 First, three pairs were removed
because the secure email tools became inoperative during the study, making it impossible for
participants to complete the study. Second, two pairs were removed because the participants
were non-native English speakers, making it difficult for them to understand the instructions
they were given.
Third, we removed three participant pairs that were clearly not paying attention to the
study survey. One participant answered “neither agree nor disagree” to all Likert items and
did not fill in answers to any other question. Another participant admitted at the end of the
study that he hadn’t noticed that the SUS questions alternated between positive and negative
phrasings. One of the participants from the third pair gave nonsense answers to several
questions. Rather than try to extract the few answers that might have been meaningful from
these participants, we felt it was best to remove them from our data.

6.8

Limitations

Our study involved a single user sending email to one other user. This approach was helpful
in understanding the basic usability of the systems tested, but it might not reveal all the
usability issues that would occur in other communication models, such as a user sending
email to multiple individuals. Future work could expand this research and examine other
usage scenarios.
Our study also has limitations common to all existing secure email studies. First,
our populations are not representative of all groups, and future research could broaden
the population (e.g., non-students, non-Gmail users). Second, our study was a short-term
4

When we excluded a participant’s results, we also excluded their partner’s results.
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study, and future research should look at these issues in a longer-term longitudinal study.
Third, our study is a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted
environment [14, 25].
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Chapter 7
Results

In this section we report on quantitative results from our our study. First, we report
the SUS score for each system. Next, we give task completion times and details on how
often participants mistakenly sent sensitive information in the clear. We then detail users’
understanding of each system’s security model. Finally, we report on users’ favorite systems
and several other minor results.

7.1

System Usability Scale

We evaluated each system using the System Usability Scale (SUS). A breakdown of the
scores are given in Table 7.1. To give context to these scores, we leverage the work of several
researchers that correlated SUS scores with more intuitive descriptions of usability [3, 4, 22, 26].
The descriptions are presented in Figure 7.1.
Percentile

15

35

F

D

Poor
Not acceptable

30

40
Mailvelope

†

C

OK
Marginal Low

50

60

Tutanota

†

60 70
65

40

80

85

90

Good
M. High

SUS Score

70

80

Virtru

†

95

100
A+

A
Excellent
Acceptable

B

Best

90

100

IBE

Pwm†
Passwords PGP
†

These SUS scores are for other secure email systems tested with the same methodology, and are reference
points for the performance of our systems. Mailvelope is a PGP-based system, Tutanota a password-based
system, Pwm an IBE-based system, and Virtru a custom key escrow scheme.

Figure 7.1: Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores
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Participant

Count

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Range

Percentile

PGP

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

75.0
76.5
75.7

16.2
13.5
14.9

±4.6
±3.9
±3.0

70.4–79.6
72.6–80.4
72.7–78.7

73%
78%
76%

IBE

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

77.7
76.9
77.3

13.8
13.3
13.5

±3.9
±3.8
±2.7

73.8–81.6
73.1–80.7
74.6–80.0

82%
80%
81%

Passwords

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

72.7
67.2
70.0

15.4
14.2
15.0

±4.4
±4.1
±3.0

68.3–77.1
63.1–71.3
67.0–73.0

66%
48%
56%

Percentiles are calculated by looking up the SUS score in a table [22]. When a SUS score is not in the table
we estimate the percentile based on the available data.

Table 7.1: SUS Scores
PGP’s SUS score of 75.7 is rated as having “Good” usability, receives a “B” grade,
and falls in the 76th percentile of systems tested with SUS. IBE’s score of 77.3 is also rated
as having “Good” usability, receives a “B+” grade, and is in the 81st percentile. Finally,
Passwords’ score of 70.0 is rated as having ”Good” usability, receives a “C” grade, and reaches
the 56th percentile.
The difference between PGP’s and IBE’s SUS scores are not statistically significant
(two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.12, Jane–p = 0.83, Both–p = 0.21).
In contrast, the difference between Jane’s PGP and Passwords scores are significant (two-tailed
student t-test, matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.28, Jane–p < 0.001, Both–p < 0.001). Also, the
difference between IBE’s and Passwords’ SUS scores are significant for both Johnny and Jane
(two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.01, Jane–p < 0.001, Both–p < 0.001)
We also compared the SUS scores for our systems against the SUS scores for other
systems previously tested with the same methodology [19]. Specifically, we compared systems
that had the same key management approach: PGP to Mailvelope, IBE to Pwm, IBE to
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Mean When
First

Mean When
Not First

81.6
79.7
80.6

71.6
74.8
73.2

−10.0 0.04
−4.9 0.25
−7.4 0.02

IBE

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

81.0
79.6
80.3

75.8
75.3
75.6

−5.2
−4.3
−4.7

0.22
0.30
0.10

Passwords

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

65.9
66.4
66.1

75.6
67.6
71.3

+9.6
+1.2
+5.2

0.04
0.80
0.11

†

p†

Count
47
47
94

Effect Size

Participant
PGP

Johnny
Jane
Both

Two-tailed student t-test, equal variance.
Result is statistically significant

Table 7.2: SUS Score By Ordering
Virtru,1 and Passwords to Tutanota. In each case, our system out-performed these other
systems (two-tailed student t-test, unequal variance—PGP and Mailvelope–p < 0.001, IBE
and Pwm–p < 0.09, IBE and Virtru–p = 0.04, Passwords and Tutanota–p < 0.001). This
gives strong evidence that the design principles integrated into MessageGuard [20, 21] lead
to strong usability in secure email systems, regardless of the key management approach used.
We also tested to see whether there was a statistically significant difference between
the SUS score ratings of Johnny and Jane. We found no significant difference for either
PGP or IBE (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance—PGP–p = 0.63, IBE–p = 0.76). For
Passwords, we found a nearly significant result, with Johnny rating Passwords 5.5 points
higher than Jane (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance—Passwords–p = 0.08), though
this difference disappears when Passwords was the first system tested (two-tailed student
t-test, equal variance—Passwords–p = 0.92).
1

Virtru uses key escrow which from the user’s perspective is functionally indistinguishable from IBE.
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We also explored whether the order in which systems were tested had an effect on
their SUS scores. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 7.2. Overall, Johnny’s
experience was significantly affected by system ordering. Jane’s experience was also affected,
but the effect was never statistically significant.
Johnny rated PGP 10 points higher when it was the first system he tested; he also
rated Passwords 9.6 points lower when it was the first system tested. More specifically,
we found that PGP’s score only dropped when it followed Passwords, and this drop was
statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance—Johnny–p < 0.01, Jane–
p = 0.13, Both–p < 0.01). Similarly, Passwords’ score only rose when it followed PGP, though
in this case the relation only existed if Passwords immediately followed PGP; this difference
was also statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance—Johnny–p < 0.01,
Jane–p = 0.23, Both–p < 0.01).
IBE’s scores were relatively stable regardless of ordering, except when the systems
were tested in this order: Passwords, IBE, PGP; in this case, IBE’s score was 14.0 points
lower than the mean score for all other orderings. This treatment had a similar effect on
PGP; when tested in this order, PGP’s score was 11.4 points lower than its mean score for
other orderings. Based on our analysis of the data, it is possible that this treatment’s low
scores for PGP and IBE is an anomaly that would disappear over the course of additional
studies.

7.2

Time

We recorded the time it took each participant to finish the assigned task with each system.
For timing purposes the tasks were split into two stages. The first stage started when Johnny
first visited the MessageGuard website and ended when he had successfully sent an encrypted
email with his SSN and last year’s tax PIN. The second stage started when Jane received
her first encrypted email and ended when she had decrypted it, replied with the appropriate
information, and received the confirmation email from Johnny. It is possible for stage one and
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Stage

Count

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Range

PGP

1
2
Both

47
45
45

8:02
3:24
11:33

3:06
1:28
3:53

±0:53
±0:26
±1:08

7:09–8:55
2:58–3:50
10:25–12:41

IBE

1
2
Both

46
44
43

3:30
5:58
9:30

1:30
2:36
3:50

±0:26
±0:46
±1:09

3:04–3:56
5:12–6:44
8:21–10:39

Passwords

1
2
Both

46
44
43

3:31
6:54
10:22

1:25
3:34
4:00

±0:25
±1:03
±1:12

3:06–3:56
5:51–7:57
9:10–11:34

Table 7.3: Time Taken to Complete Task (min:sec)
two to overlap; if Johnny first sends an encrypted message without the required information,
this will start the timer for stage two without stopping the timer for stage one.2
Timings were calculated using the video recordings of the participants’ screen. In
one instance the video file of the recording was corrupted, making it impossible to gather
task completion times. In three other instances the study coordinators forgot to start the
video recording, causing either a complete (one instance) or partial (two instances) loss of
data. Task completion time data from the remaining recordings is given in Table 7.3 and
Figure 7.2.
By design, PGP shifts a significant portion of user effort from stage two to stage
one—Jane installs PGP in stage one instead of stage two. As such, the difference in stage
completion times between PGP and the other two systems are statistically significant (twotailed student t-test, matched pairs—both stages, both systems–p < 0.001). For total task
completion time (stage one + stage two), only the difference between PGP and IBE is
statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—PGP and IBE–p = 0.05,
PGP and Passwords–p = 0.14, IBE and Passwords–p = 0.321).
2

We took this approach as stage one is clearly not finished, but Jane is also able to start making progress
on completing stage two.
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PGP

Stage 1

IBE

Stage 2

Passwords
0:00

2:00

4:00

6:00

8:00

10:00

12:00

14:00

16:00

18:00

Mean When
First

Mean When
Not First

47
45
45

9:36
4:20
13:56

7:13
2:54
10:14

−2:23 0.01
−1:26 < 0.01
−3:42 0.01

IBE

1
2
Both

46
44
43

4:47
8:01
12:55

2:49
4:48
7:39

−1:58 < 0.001
−3:13 < 0.001
−5:16 < 0.001

Passwords

1
2
Both

46
44
43

4:50
9:49
14:48

3:01
5:48
8:50

−1:49 < 0.001
−4:01 < 0.001
−5:58 < 0.001

†

p†

Count

PGP

1
2
Both

Effect Size

Stage

Figure 7.2: Individual Participant Task Completion Times

Two-tailed student t-test, equal variance.
Result is statistically significant

Table 7.4: Time Taken to Complete Task (min:sec)

47

20:00

As shown in Table 7.4, the task for the first system tested took longer than the other
two.3 The effect was most extreme for Jane, who didn’t know that she would be using secure
email until receiving her first message from Johnny. Interestingly, system ordering had the
smallest effect on PGP’s task completion time; though, this could be tied to PGP having the
highest overall times.

7.3

Mistakes

We define mistakes to be instances when users send sensitive information in normal email
when it should have been encrypted. For Passwords, a user is also considered to have made a
mistake if they send the email-encryption password in a plaintext email.4
In PGP and IBE there were a low number of mistakes, and each was made by Johnny
(PGP–[n = 1; 2%], IBE–[2; 4%]). In all three cases, the participant transmitted the sensitive
information in the unencrypted greeting of the encrypted message. This happened in spite of
the fact that two participants watched the compose tutorial, which warned them that text in
that field would not be encrypted. This problem area could likely be addressed by making
users explicitly enable unencrypted greetings, instead of displaying it as a default field.
In Passwords, all mistakes were a result of users sending their password in plaintext
email (Johnny–[9; 19%], Jane–[1; 2%]). For five of these mistakes (5; 11%), Johnny first
sent the password over cellular text messaging, but for various reasons Jane never got this
message. When Jane received her encrypted email, she didn’t yet have the password and
would email Johnny requesting the password, which he sent to her using email. It is unclear
whether this represents users’ lack of understanding regarding the security of email [15], a
lack of concern for the safety of their sensitive information, an artifact of taking the study
in a trusted environment [25], or a mixture of the three. Additionally, in four cases Johnny
used Google Chat to send their password, giving Google access to both the secure email and
3

There wasn’t a strong difference in task timing between whether the system was second or third.
Mistakes can also include revealing PGP or IBE private keys, though neither of our systems allowed users
to make this mistake.
4
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the password used to encrypt it. Still, we chose not to include this as a mistake as it is not
as egregious as sending the password over email.
Regardless, we note that the mistake rate of our Passwords system is significantly
lower than that for Tutanota. In Ruoti et al.’s evaluation of Tutanota, a system which allows
users to password-encrypt email, they found that Johnny sent the password in the clear 68%
of the time. This is 49% greater than our system’s rate, and the difference is statistically
significant (N − 1 chi-squared test—χ2 [1, N = 72] = 16.65, p < 0.001). This is likely due to
the fact that during password input, our Passwords system instructed users to send their
password using a non-email communication channel.

7.4

Understanding

In the post-study interview we asked participants to identify what an attacker would need
to do to read their encrypted email. The goal of this question was to evaluate whether
participants understood the security model of each system they had tested. Study coordinators
would continue probing participants until they were confident regarding whether or not the
participant had a proper understanding of the system in question. In five cases (Johnny–2,
Jane–3), the study session ran late and participants had to leave without completing the
post-study interview. As such, percentages in this Subsection are calculated off a different
total number of participants (Johnny–45, Jane–44, Both–89).
Participants had a poor understanding of both PGP’s (Johnny–[2; 4%], Jane–[2; 5%],
Both–[4; 4%]) and IBE’s (Johnny–[2; 4%], Jane–[3; 7%], Both–[5; 6%]) security models.
Generally, participants believed that if an attacker could gain access to a user’s email then
they could decrypt that user’s messages. Only a handful of participants recognized that
signing up for an account prior to downloading the tool was meaningful. During the interviews,
most participants indicated they saw no difference in the security of IBE and PGP.
In strong contrast, nearly all participants had a clear understanding of how passwordbased encryption protected their emails (Johnny–[41; 91%], Jane–[41; 93%], Both–[82; 92%]).
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Johnny
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Jane

Both

Figure 7.3: Participants’ Favorite System
7.5

Favorite System

At the end of the study survey, participants were asked to indicate which system was their
favorite and why. Later, during the post-study interview, participants were given descriptions
of each system’s security model and were invited to ask further clarifying questions as needed.
After hearing these descriptions, participants were allowed to update which system they felt
was their favorite. Participants’ preferences, both pre- and post-survey, are summarized in
Figure 7.3.
Overall, participants were split on which system they preferred (During Survey—
PGP–[26; 28%], IBE–[36; 38%], Passwords–[29; 31%]; After Interview—PGP–[29; 31%],
IBE–[34; 36%], Passwords–[28; 30%]). While IBE was a slight favorite, the difference was
not statistically significant (Chi-squared test—Survey–χ2 [2, N = 282] = 2.56, p = 0.28,
Interview–χ2 [2, N = 282] = 1.01, p = 0.60). Of the three participants who did not select a
favorite system (3; 3%), two indicated that they liked all three systems equally, and the third
participant indicated that they disliked all three systems because he erroneously believed
that the systems did not store his encrypted email in Gmail.
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Survey

PGP

IBE

Passwords

Net
Change

Interview

Johnny

PGP
IBE
Passwords

–
2
0

3
–
0

0
1
–

−1
+0
+1

Jane

PGP
IBE
Passwords

–
4
1

1
–
2

0
1
–

+4
−2
−2

Both

PGP
IBE
Passwords

–
6
1

4
–
2

0
2
–

+3
−2
−1

Participant

Table 7.5: Changes in Favorite System Between Survey and Interview
Approximately a sixth of participants (15; 16%) changed their favorite system after
better understanding the security models of each system. These changes are detailed in
Table 7.5. The differences were all small, with the only notable changes being Jane’s overall
preference for switching from IBE to PGP.

7.6

Other Results

We observed participants to determine how often they used various features in MessageGuard.
We noted that Johnny frequently watched both the compose and read tutorials (Compose–[14;
87%], Read–[38; 81%]). Jane similarly watched the read tutorial (43; 91%), but rarely
composed a new email and as such was rarely given a chance to view the compose tutorial5
(6 out of 10 participants; 60%). We also found that Johnny was somewhat likely to include a
plaintext greeting with his encrypted email (33; 70%). When Jane did send a new encrypted
message, she included an unencrypted greeting a little under half of the time (4 of 10
participants; 40%).
5

Encrypted replies do not contain plaintext greetings.
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I want to be able
to encrypt my email
I would encrypt
email frequently

Johnny
Jane
Both

Johnny
Jane
Both
0%

Strongly agree

20%

Agree
Disagree

40%

60%

80%

100%

Neither agree nor disagree
Strongly disagree

Figure 7.4: Participant Opinions Regarding Secure Email
We also recorded how Johnny sent the password he used to encrypt his email when
using the Passwords system. Johnny largely preferred phone-based communication channels
for communicating the password with Jane (cellular text messaging–23, phone call–11, email–
9, Google Chat–4, in person–2, Facebook Chat–1).6 Also, in three cases (phone call–2, email
–1) Johnny did not actually transmit the password, but merely gave clues to Jane that were
sufficient for her to figure it out.
At the end of the survey, participants were asked whether they wanted to be able
to encrypt their email and whether they would frequently do so. Participant responses to
these questions are summarized in Figure 7.4. Overall, participants were in strong agreement
that email encryption is something they want (want–[71; 76%], unsure–[18; 19%], don’t
want–[5; 5%]). Still, participants were split on how often they would use secure email, with
the plurality going to infrequent use (frequent use–[30; 32%], unsure–[28; 30%], infrequent
use–[36; 39%]). This is in line with previous results regarding desired secure email usage [20].

6
We note that these usage numbers do not sum to 47 as Johnny sometimes used multiple methods to
communicate the password.
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Chapter 8
Discussion

In this section we discuss participants’ qualitative feedback and observations from
the study coordinators. Within this section, participants have each been assigned a unique
identifier R[1–47][A,B], where the final letter refers to the role of the participant (e.g., R1A
and R1B were Johnny and Jane, respectively, in the first study session).

8.1

PGP

Our work succeeded at creating a highly usable PGP-based secure email system that was liked
by participants. In general, participants described the PGP system as fast and easy-to-use.
The most common complaint regarding PGP was that recipients needed to install
PGP before they could be sent encrypted messages. As stated by R1A, “It’s not great that
sending someone an encrypted email means you have to ask them to download an extension.”
Additionally, some participants felt that they were less likely to install the system if they
didn’t already have an encrypted message. For example, R9B described,
“I am more motivated (i.e., I can more readily see the need) to install the app if
the encrypted message is already sitting there in my inbox. Also, the fewer emails
I have to send/receive the better”.
A small number of participants also recognized that sending PGP messages to multiple
participants could become cumbersome if most of the recipients had never used PGP before.
In this regard, R7A said,
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“[PGP] also didn’t let me send the email until they had done so [installed the
system]. This would be annoying if I needed to send many emails for work or
something similar. I would want to send the email and move onto the next task,
without waiting for the other person to have the extension.”
On the other hand, a small number of participants recognized that these extra steps
were tied to PGP’s stronger security mode. In this vein, R19A stated,
“Easy to use and felt very secure. There were more steps to this version than the
IBE version, but that made it seem more secure.”
The annoyance of requiring recipients to first install PGP was somewhat alleviated
by the fact that the system would automatically generate an invitation message explaining
to the recipient how to install MessageGuard. This made it clear to participants what they
needed to do next to send or receive an encrypted email. For example, participants R9A and
R33A stated, respectively,
“I really like the idea of being able to send encrypted messages regularly. I also
liked the automatic e-mail generated for having the recipients set up the system as
well.”
“I also liked that it was easy to send an email to someone who didn’t have
MessageGuard–PGP and they could easily download it.”
The most significant issue we discovered with our PGP system was that very few
participants understood its security model (4; 4%), with most participants assuming that an
attacker only needed access to the user’s email account to read their encrypted email. It is
likely that because so much of PGP’s key management was automated (e.g., key generation,
uploading and retrieval of of public keys) that participants had insufficient contextual clues to
determine the system’s security model. While reducing the automation of the system could
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improve understanding, these changes would likely come at an unacceptably high usability
cost [17, 24, 30]. Future work should examine how we can help users establish accurate mental
models of PGP’s security model in a way that does not significantly impact the usability of
the system.
After explaining to participants PGP’s actual security model, they felt much more
confident in its security. Particularly, participants liked that it did not rely on any third
parties. For example, after hearing about PGP’s security model R47B enthusiastically
changed her favorite system from Passwords to PGP and stated,
“Just because it had to be from your computer, it seems like, if they were to get
the [encrypted contents], it’d be a little bit harder for them to get [the plaintext
contents].”
Participants’ interest in PGP was tempered by the risk of losing all their encrypted
email if something were to happen to the private key stored on their computer. In this regard,
R18A expressed,
“I guess, depending on what you’re doing, [PGP] could be helpful, but it could
also be very frustrating . . . if you changed systems or something like that, it could
be frustrating to realize that you couldn’t decrypt previously sent messages.”
Future work could examine how to best backup and transfer private keys between
devices in a usable and secure fashion.

8.2

IBE

Similar to prior results regarding IBE, participants found the system to be extremely usable.
Additionally, task completion times show that IBE was faster than the other two systems.
Compared to prior version of secure email based on IBE, our version required that
users sign up for an account before they could retrieve their IBE private key.1 Having a
1

Our PGP system also required users to establish a separate MessageGuard account.
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separate account prevents a sometimes-malicious email provider from downloading the user’s
IBE private key.2 While most users were fine with setting up an account, several participants
indicated that they disliked the need to set up an account. For example, R3B and R5B
respectively expressed,
“As a general comment, I think the password one was my favorite, since you
didn’t have to create an account for MessageGuard.”
“Easy to use, installed it, created an account (I liked that I had to create an
account), worked well”
During the user study, several participant pairs encountered an edge case for IBE—
Jane had multiple email address aliases, and the message was encrypted for a different alias
than Jane used when she set up her MessageGuard account. This resulted in Jane being
unable to decrypt Johnny’s message. This was especially confusing for Johnny and Jane as
both of them had set up the secure email systems but had no indication of what they needed
to do to resolve the current issue.
The difficulty of handling email aliases is not limited to IBE and affects PGP as well.
As of now, it is unclear how best to solve this problem. MessageGuard’s design anonymizes
the identity of the recipients, which makes it difficult to tell users which email alias they need
to register with their MessageGuard account. This an area that future work could examine,
as it represents an important edge case for the adoption of secure email.
As with PGP, participants had a poor understanding of IBE’s security model. In
fact, nearly all participants assumed that PGP and IBE had the same security model. After
instructing participants on IBE’s security model, many participants were happy to hear it
was more secure than they assumed. After understanding each system’s security model, some
participants who initially preferred IBE switched their preference to PGP; most remained
with IBE, stating that it had good enough security. Additionally, these participants felt that
2

As such, our IBE system has stronger security than the IBE systems previously developed by Ruoti et
al. [16, 20].
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IBE’s ability to send an encrypted message to recipients without ensuring they had installed
MessageGuard trumped the security drawbacks of IBE.

8.3

Passwords

While participants gave Passwords a lower SUS score than either PGP or IBE, they did
feel that overall it was quite usable. Still, even though users rated Passwords as usable, a
substantial number indicated that they liked PGP and IBE due to their not requiring a
password to encrypt email. For example, R29A said, “There was the benefit of not having to
send a password by exterior means.” Also, R32A stated, “It was simple to send a message
and you didn’t need to set up a password.”
The main problem with password-based encryption was the need to communicate the
password to the recipient. As already discussed, many participants shared their password
over plaintext email. In some cases, they recognized that this didn’t seem secure, but still
proceeded. For example, R32A said,
“The recipient of your email needs to know your password before they can open
your email, so we ended up sharing the password through an non-encrypted email
which seems counterproductive.”
Even when using an out-of-band channel, some participants questioned the security of
those channels. R24B and R34B, respectively, described this concern:
“We also communicated the password through a text message. I’m not sure what
that does for the security of the system if we are using an outside and unprotected
means of communication in order to make it work.”
“We used a text to transport the password and I don’t know that that is necessarily
the safest way. If there was some way to have the person get the password safely,
that would be great.”
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Many participants also felt that communicating a password out-of-band negated the
need to use secure email, as they could just communicate the sensitive information over the
out-of-band channel. R39B indicated,
“It was way lame that I had to call him because I might as well have just given
him the info that way. . . . If I’m gonna communicate with them through email,
its because I want to do it through email, not through a phone call.”
Several participants also noted that if they had to securely communicate with multiple
people, it would be annoying to manage separate passwords for each contact. In this regard,
R9A expressed,
“I may want to use [Passwords] often in sending regular messages to many people.
If I had to share a password each time, it may make the process cumbersome.”
After using the Passwords system, participants had several suggestions for how it
could be improved. First, participants felt that within an email thread the password used
to encrypt the email should be static and unchanging. While users could reuse the same
password to encrypt replies, many participants became confused about this and created a new
password, necessitating an additional round of password exchange. Second, some participants
felt it would be helpful to have a built-in password complexity meter or random password
generator when creating passwords. As stated by R25A and R18B, respectively,
“I would want it to tell me if my password is complex or even provide random
passwords that are complex. I would want this to make myself feel more confident
that what I was sending could not be hacked or decrypted easily be someone else
that I did not intent.”
“If you don’t have a random password generator, then people will just end up
using familiar passwords, which is actually more of a problem than if there were
no passwords at all.”
58

Unlike PGP and IBE, the security model for the Passwords system was well-understood
by participants. This is likely due to the fact that users have an ingrained sense of how
passwords protect their data. Understanding the security model of passwords helped users
trust the system’s security. As stated by R3A and R23A, respectively,
“It was nice to be able to create a password that only myself and the sender know.
It felt more secure. . . . ”
“Though it is the most time consuming (and some would say the most hassle
as well), it is obviously the most secure. I wouldn’t use it for every email, but I
would certainly use it for sending private information.”

8.4

Key Management Trade-offs

As partially discussed above, we identify usability and security trade-offs for each key
management approach. These trade-offs were identified based on both our quantitative data
and participants’ qualitative responses. Overall, there were two clear trade-offs.
First, hiding cryptographic details increases usability, but inhibits understanding of
a system’s security model. For example, both IBE and PGP hid key management from
the user, leading to high usability scores. However, in the post-study interview it was clear
that participants did not understand the security model of either system. In contrast, the
Passwords system required users to manually manage their keys (i.e., passwords). This led to
lower usability scores for Passwords, but nearly all users understood its security model.
Second, tools that rely on third-party key servers sacrifice security, but significantly
reduce the burden of adopting the system. For example, evaluations of PGP systems that use
manual key exchange have consistently found these systems to be unusable [17, 24, 30]. In
our PGP system, we employed a third-party key directory, which significantly improved its
usability at the expense of trusting a third-party. Similarly, IBE fully trusts its third-party
server with private keys, making it trivial to send any recipient an encrypted message. Even
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though participants recognized the lower security of IBE, many indicated that it still had
“good enough” security for their needs.

8.5

User Attitudes Regarding the Design of Secure Email

We asked participants whether they would be interested in MessageGuard including a
master password.3 Overall, participants were interested in this feature (Johnny–[33; 70%],
Jane–[35; 74%], Both–[72; 77%]). Participants felt that this would provide an important
security property when multiple users shared a single computer. R6A and R18A expressed,
respectively,
“I let others use my computer enough it would be nice to now my email was
relatively safe when I was not in control.”
“I like the idea of having more control over what is visible to other users, especially
in cases of using a shared computer.”
The participants that were not interested in a master password indicated that they
had sole access to their computer, and that a master would add a hassle for no real security
gain. As described by R3B and R9B, respectively,
“I wouldn’t like the inconvenience of having to enter in an additional password
when opening my browser.”
“My computer is password protected. While someone could theoretically get on
and obtain sensitive information, I watch my computer like I watch my 1-year
old: very closely. Not anticipating needing to protect my data from non-authorized
users of my devices.”
3

With a master password, MessageGuard would not encrypt or decrypt email until this password was
entered. Moreover, cryptographic keys would be encrypted using the master password before being stored to
disk.
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Since a majority of participants were interested in a master password, future work
should explore how to best implement a master password, with special attention paid to its
potential usability impact.
We note that the split in participants’ opinions regarding master passwords demonstrates two important principles of usable, secure email. First, the potential users of secure
email have very different usage scenarios (e.g., shared computer vs. private computer).
Second, no one set of features satisfies all users. While these principles may seem obvious,
the sad reality is that they are not being respected by any of the industrial secure email
systems we have previously tested. Our experience has shown that secure email tools are
largely built for a single user group, and are not sufficiently customizable for groups that
have different usability and security criteria.
Participants also expressed a strong desire to better understand how the secure email
systems worked. They felt that this would help them verify that the system was properly
protecting their data. Additionally, several participants stated that they would not feel
comfortable using a “random” tool from the Internet. Instead, they looked for tools that
were verified by security experts or were distributed and endorsed by a well-known brand
(e.g., Google). R40B and R4A shared, respectively,
“I’m wary of downloading unfamiliar things because of viruses. But I don’t know
a lot about viruses. . . . I think to use it I would have to know it was really legit
form a legit company, or approved by someone. I don’t know if I could trust a
random program with my personal info.”
“I need very strong reasons to believe that it’s not just a way that the workers of
MessageGuard can access my personal information. Like knowing that it’s not a
spam or can be broken into.”
Interestingly, a white paper on MessageGuard’s design is available to view on the
MessageGuard website, but only two users actually looked at it. In conjunction with
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participants’ responses, this behavior suggests that users are not actually interested in
personally reading about MessageGuard’s security, but rather want these details available for
critique by security-conscious friends and experts. Users would then base their trust in the
system on these individuals’ recommendations.
Several participants were especially delighted with MessageGuard’s ability to verify
the identity of the sender. For example, R16A stated, “I could verify the sender and make
sure the email wasn’t from someone or something sketchy.” Similarly, R38 said, “I like that
it encrypts and that it tells you whether the name of the sender is their real name.” This
indicates that users are aware of the ability for sender addresses to be spoofed, and that they
are interested in secure email’s ability to prevent this type of attack.
Finally, we note that users are interested in being able to toggle encryption for
individual email messages in an email thread. In MessageGuard once an email is encrypted,
future replies in that thread are always encrypted. While this helps better protect encrypted
email, participants indicated that they would prefer to be able to turn off encryption for
specific emails in a thread. For example, R45A indicated,
“When I reply to an e-mail chain, I would like to have the ability to turn off the
encryption, instead of not having the option.”

8.6

Validation of Prior Research

Our research validates prior secure email research. First, our research confirms that usability
modifications suggested by Atwater et al. [1]—obviating the use of master passwords, autogenerating invitational emails, using a key directory—do indeed increase the usability of
PGP-based secure email. This confirmation is important as errors in Atwater et al.’s study
made it unclear if their results were valid.
Third, our results demonstrate that the design principles for usable, secure email
discovered by Ruoti et al. [16, 20] generalize beyond IBE, and are also applicable to PGP- and
password-based systems. Moreover, we demonstrate that these principles are sufficient to make
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PGP—a previously unusable type of secure email [17, 24, 30]—highly usable and preferred
to other approaches by a third of our participants. Many participant responses demonstrated
the importance of Ruoti et al.’s design principles (e.g., tight-integration; context-sensitive,
inline tutorials; unencrypted greetings) in their high estimation of our systems’ usability.
For example, R7A, R9A, R11A, R26B, and R34B all commented on these various design
principles:
“I really like the integration into Gmail, so that I can safely send information
without having to use an entirely new system.”
“The tutorial was very helpful. I also found the icons to be helpful in using the
tool. I was surprised at how easily the program integrated into my e-mail. There
was never any confusion as to what I needed to do or as to what was going on.”
“The tutorials were great. I really felt like I didn’t need to know much to be able
to use it.”
“I like . . . that the subject/top of the email are not encrypted to help others
realize that this is not spam.”
“Cause that [auto-generated PGP invitation email], where it was just this, ‘Hey,
I’m sending you an encrypted message’, that felt very fake, kind of like those
Skype messages when it’s like, ‘Hey I wanna be your friend’, and you’re like, I
don’t know you so I’m gonna delete it. . . . I feel like it [the greeting field] helped
me realize it was him because it had that personality behind it.”
Finally, we gathered further evidence that paired-participant usability studies [19] are
helpful in assessing the usability of secure email systems. When asked, participants indicated
that they enjoyed working with a friend and that they felt it was more natural than it would
be with a study coordinator; this was especially true for our Passwords system, where they
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indicated that calling their friend was natural, but not something they would feel comfortable
doing with a coordinator. R7B stated,
“I think it was easier, just ’cause, the familiarity, I send her emails all the time,
we message all the time, and so it was just like, it wasn’t like, ‘Am I allowed to
do this, am I supposed to do this, like what kind of communication can I have?’
Like, I know exactly how to talk to my wife, so it was really [easy].”
Additionally, we note that in both our quantitative and qualitative data, we found
several strong differences between Johnny and Jane. This indicates that there is value in
gathering information regarding the usability of secure email for both roles.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion

In our work, we compared the usability of three different key management approaches
to secure email: PGP, IBE, and Passwords. To test these approaches, we used MessageGuard
to build three secure email systems which each adopted one of these three key management
schemes. The systems were built using state-of-the-art design principles for usable, secure
email [1, 2, 16, 20]. We implemented these systems using a modular key management
framework that we designed and built. This allowed each of our systems to share as much
of their user interface as possible. We validated our design decisions through the use of
a cognitive walkthrough. We then evaluated the usability of each system using a pairedparticipant study methodology [19]. This evaluation was the first formal A/B evaluation of
the usability of different key management schemes. It is also the largest secure email study
to date, including twice as many participants as previous studies [19].
The results of our study demonstrate that each of these three key management
approaches can be used to create usable, secure email; though each has their own trade-offs.
As such, our research represents the first time that PGP-based email encryption has been
shown to be usable by novices. Additionally, participants’ qualitative feedback provides
valuable insights into the usability trade-offs of each key management approach, as well as
several general principles of usable, secure email. Finally, our work provides evidence that
validates both the design principles used in our systems as well as the study methodology.
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Chapter 10
Future Work

The work described in this thesis invites several areas of investigation in the future.
We found that the security model of password-based secure email is far more accessible and
intuitive to users than that of PGP- or IBE-based secure email. This is an open problem in
the field of usable security; there are currently no effective, vetted methods for educating
users on the use of public and private keys, and the trust and security implications that
accompany them. Now that usable secure email has been shown to be feasible, educating
users on the nature of public key encryption is an even more important area of research.
Users should understand the security assurances provided by their messaging platforms, and
the precautions they should take to avoid security vulnerabilities or usability missteps. The
greater degree of understanding users have in a system, the more educated decisions users
can make with regard to what security and usability tradeoffs they are comfortable with.
Now that we have an effective platform for performing usability research into key
management, there are several options for future research and development efforts. Instead
of restricting MessageGuard users into one of several key management approaches, we can
allow users to “upgrade” their security over time, escalating the security provided by the
system as their proficiency and confidence in the system grows. For example, new users could
get onboarded into MessageGuard through IBE. Once users wish to further improve their
security by removing the reliance on a third-party key escrow server, they could be given the
option to seamlessy transition to PGP encryption.
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Password-based secure email was implemented using ephemeral keys; when users close
their browser window, any passwords previously entered for encryption or decryption are
lost. This is beneficial security-wise, but can have negative usability implications. We did not
evaluate this during this study; our task did not involve forcing participants to close their
browsers and be exposed to this behavior. Future work could A/B test password ephemerality
and quantify the associated usability tradeoff.
As part of the post-study questionnaire, we asked participants about their opinions
on master passwords, which could be used to protect encryption keys from unauthorized use.
A majority of participants indicated that they would prefer having a master password, and
future work could analyze its usability implications.
There are options for new key management approaches that might be studied. One
intriguing option would be a fusion of IBE- and password-based secure email. This fusion
would present a stronger security model than either approach on its own. Neither leakage of
the password, nor compromise of the key escrow server, would be sufficient on their own to
expose users’ messages to attack. The usability implications of this approach bear further
investigation.
The security assurances provided by PGP with a trusted third-party key directory are
highly similar to those provided by S/MIME. In the future, MessageGuard could be extended
to support S/MIME-based secure email. This would allow the usability of S/MIME to be
evaluated and compared against the usability metrics gathered in this work.
Finally, future work could involve longitudinal studies of MessageGuard users. Our
study provided a brief introduction to MessageGuard and short-term observation. By
observing long-term use of MessageGuard, valuable information could be gained with regard
to how secure email might be used in the real world.
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A.1

Recruitment Poster

Email User Study
We are conduc ng research on how to improve Email. We
need pairs of people, so bring a friend and come help us
learn how to improve email!
Sign up at isrl.youcanbook.me
The study will take approximately 45 minutes
Must bring a friend
Compensa on will be $15 for each of you
Must both have a Gmail account

Internet Security Research Lab
2236 TMCB
Provo, UT 84602‐6576
(801) 422‐7893

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me

Sign up at
isrl.youcanbook.me
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For more info, contact
Sco Ruo
Phone: (801) 300‐7013
Email: ruo @isrl.byu.edu

A.2

Study Coordinator Instructions

1. Have each participant sign two copies of the consent form. Give one copy to the
participant to keep.
2. Use a coin flip to determine who is Johnny.
3. Johnny will remain in this room and Jane will go next door. (Door code: xxxxx)
(a) Ask the participant to sit down. Invite them to adjust the chair if they wish.
(b) Tell them, “You and your friend are in different rooms, and will need to
work together to complete a task. During this task, we will provide you
with some information that needs to be sent over email. Other than
this information, you can feel free to communicate with your friend
however you normally would. While you are waiting for email from
your friend, feel free to relax and use your phone or the Internet.”
4. Do the following:
(a) Start the audio recorder.
(b) Open “Open Broadcasting Software”. Start recording.
(c) On the desktop, click the “Start Survey” icon.
5. Before using each system, the survey will instruct the participant to tell you they are
ready to begin the next task. When they do so, complete the following steps:
(a) (Johnny) Look at which system the participant will be using, and provide Johnny
with the appropriate information sheet.
(b) (Jane) Provide Jane with the generic information sheet.
(c) Start the VM software and resume the snapshot [VM→snapshot→Two Person
Study (2016)].
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(d) Change the view to full screen-exclusive mode.
(View→Full Screen; View→Exclusive).
(e) Notify the other coordinator which system will be used.
(f) Record in the notes the order the systems are used.
6. During the course of the task pay attention to the following items:
(a) (Jane) When Jane decrypts her email, give her the appropriate information sheet
for her to complete the task.
(b) Make notes of anything interesting you see.
(c) If the participant sends sensitive information in the clear, make a note of this,
then instruct them that they need to use the secure email system to send that
information.
(d) Note how participants transmit passwords (e.g., phone call, text, email).
(e) During the study, participants may have questions for you. Answer any questions
regarding the study task, but do not instruct participants on how to use the
systems being tested. Instead, encourage them to continue trying.
(f) In case users wrote their codes down incorrectly, we have included them at the
end of this document.
7. When the task is complete, the participants will be instructed to tell you they have
finished the task. When they do so, complete the following steps:
(a) Ensure that the participants have correctly completed the task.
(b) Exit exclusive mode by pressing `right ctrl + right alt`.
(c) Restore the snapshot [VM→snapshot→Two Person Study (2016)].
(d) Switch to the survey and have the participant continue the survey.
8. When the survey is finished, ask the participant about their experience.
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(a) Ask the participants about any problems they encountered during the study and
how they dealt with them. Try and understand what the user was thinking. Also
ask the participant if something in MessageGuard could be changed to address
this issue.
(b) Ask them about anything you felt was unusual or unique in their experience.
(c) For each key management scheme (follow the order they used the systems
in):
i. Ask participants who can read their messages. If unclear, ask them what
would an attacker need to do to steal their secure email.
ii. Record whether the user correctly understood the scheme in the
notes.
(d) For each key management scheme (not concurrent with previous bullet, follow
the order they used the systems in):
i. “I will now describe to you what an attacker would need to do
in order to read your encrypted email. If you have any questions
about my descriptions or how the systems work, feel free to ask.”
ii. Explain to the users the security provided by each scheme. Descriptions
are provided on the next page.
iii. Ask the participant if, based on this information, their opinion on any system
changes.
iv. Ask the participant which system they would prefer to use in the real-world
with their friends.
v. Record this information in the notes.
9. Close out the individual portion of the study.
(a) Stop the video recording.
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(b) (Jane) Stop the audio recording, and bring your participant back to the main
room.
10. Now that the participants are together, ask the participants about their experience.
(a) “How would your ideal email encryption system function? If you would like to,
feel free to use the whiteboard to sketch ideas.”
(b) “What did you think about doing a study with a friend?”
11. Close out the study.
(a) (Johnny) Stop the audio recording.
(b) Clean the whiteboard if needed.
(c) Thank the participants for their time.
(d) Help them fill out the compensation form, and direct them to the CS office.

A.3
A.3.1

Participant Worksheets
Participant A Worksheet

In this task, you’ll be using MessageGuard - {PGP, IBE, Passwords}.
Go to https://messageguard.io/{pgp, ibe, passwords} and get the tool.
Please encrypt and send the following information to your friend using MessageGuard
- {PGP, IBE, Passwords}:
• SSN: XXX-XX-XXXX
• PIN: XXXX
Enter the confirmation code provided by your friend:

Enter the PIN provided by your friend:
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Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN from your friend, send an
email to your friend letting them know you received this information. After you have sent
this confirmation email, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

A.3.2

Participant B General Worksheet

Please wait for your friend’s email with their last year’s tax PIN and SSN.
Enter your friend’s SSN. Include dashes.

Enter your friend’s PIN.

Once you have written down your friends SSN and PIN, let the study coordinator
know that you are ready to reply to your friend with their confirmation code and PIN.

A.3.3

Participant B System-Specific Worksheet

You have completed your friends taxes and need to send them the confirmation code and this
years tax PIN from their tax submission.
Since your friend used MessageGuard - {PGP, IBE, Passwords} to send sensitive
information to you, please also use MessageGuard - {PGP, IBE, Passwords} to send them
the confirmation code and PIN.
• Confirmation code: XXXXXXXX
• PIN: XXXX
Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your friend, wait for them to
reply to you and confirm they got the information. Once you have gotten this confirmation,
let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

75

A.4

Descriptions of Key Management Schemes

These descriptions were read to study participants following the study questionnaire.

A.4.1

PGP

In the {first, second, third} system you tested, your email was secured using PGP. In PGP,
when you installed the system, a lock and key were created. The lock was stored on the
MessageGuard website, allowing anyone to download it and use it to encrypt email for you.
The key is kept on your own computer and is needed to decrypt your email. To read your
encrypted email, an attacker would need to break into your computer and steal this key.
In PGP, your recipients need to install the system and generate their lock and key
before you can encrypt and send email to them. If you lose or delete your key, email encrypted
with your lock will be inaccessible.

A.4.2

IBE

In the {first, second, third} system you tested, your email was secured using IBE. In IBE,
anyone can encrypt email for you, and the key to decrypt that email is stored on the
MessageGuard website. To read your email, an attacker would need to break into the
MessageGuard account you created during the study, and steal your key. Because the
MessageGuard website does not have access to your email, it cannot decrypt it.

A.4.3

Passwords

In the {first, second, third} system you tested, your email was secured using a password
you or your friend chose. To read your email, an attacker would need to steal or guess that
password.
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